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I. ABSTRACT
Article 11 of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) and Article 34 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) prohibit
quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods. The EEA is
monitored by the European Free Trade Area Court (“EFTA Court”) and
the TFEU is monitored by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In
theory, the EFTA Court and the ECJ should interpret Article 11 and
Article 34 in the same manner in order to promote harmonization of the
law on the free movement of goods and allow for further economic
integration between EFTA and the EU. However, as this work reveals,
there are some significant differences in the jurisprudence on the free
movement of goods between the EFTA Court and the ECJ that threaten
the legal harmony of the EEA and could potentially lead to an uncertain
trade climate between the two trade groups.
II. INTRODUCTION
A. The EU and EFTA
Although the beginnings of the European Union (“EU”) can be traced
to an earlier time, it was the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 by six
European countries that began the path toward economic integration in
the form of a common market.1 The EU, formerly the European
Economic Community (“EEC”), which currently consists of 28 memberstates, is a common market that requires that all member-states maintain
a common import policy (i.e., customs union), in conjunction with an
agreement for the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor.2 The
goal behind the creation of the EU/EEC was to create a larger, politically
unified, economic area.3

1. W. RAYMOND DUNCAN ET AL., WORLD POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211
(2006).
2. THEODORE H. COHN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 141
(4th ed. 2008).
3. RICHARD BALDWIN & CHARLES WYPLOSZ, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 45–46 (4th ed. 2012).
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The European Free Trade Area (“EFTA”) was founded as a “reaction”
to the EU/EEC.4 The principal aim of the Framers of EFTA was to prevent
the EU/EEC from becoming a powerful, protectionist customs union that
could dominate the continent.5 EFTA, like the EU, has created much
integration across borders by elites, business groups, and trade unions.6
There is comment that the citizens of the member-states of EFTA preferred a
lesser form of integration in comparison to that of the EU/EEC.7 The trade
group was founded by way of the Stockholm Convention signed in 1960.8
EFTA was created by a set of member-states that were not comfortable
with the higher level of integration found in the EEC.9 In contrast to the
EU/EEC, EFTA had no political goals and comprised a mere one
institution.10 The EFTA member-states at the time of its formation were
wealthy, developed, and would seemingly have no trouble making adjustments
to integrate along the lines of a free trade arrangement.11 Given its status
as a free trade association, and not a customs union, external trade policy
does not have to be collectively decided.12 However, EFTA was an
immediate boon to its smaller states while the United Kingdom alone
provided well over 50% of the trade group’s population.13 University of
Illinois Professor Larry Neal argues that EFTA was birthed largely due to
the United Kingdom’s recognition that the EU member-states were
enjoying export-led growth and it wanted to enjoy the free movement
principles without the restrictions of the remaining parts of the agreement.14

4. MARTIN DEDMAN, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
1945-2008: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 116 (2d ed. 2010).
5. ANDREW GLENCROSS, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POLITICAL
UNION OR A HOUSE DIVIDED? 48 (2014).
6. WOLFRAM KAISER, Transnational Networks in European Governance: The
Informal Politics of Integration, in THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A
TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950-72, at 26 (Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht &
Morten Rasmussen eds. 2009).
7. GLENCROSS, supra note 5, at 225.
8. JOHN MCCORMICK & JONATHAN OLSEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND
POLICIES 64 (5th ed. 2014).
9. GUY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 38 (3d ed. 2008).
10. MCCORMICK & OLSEN, supra note 8, at 64.
11. Id. at 81.
12. BALDWIN & WYPLOSZ, supra note 3, at 15.
13. DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 97.
14. LARRY NEAL, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 275
(2007).
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B. The EEA
There is some evidence that less formal integration between the EU and
EFTA was taking place before the EEA Agreement’s adoption.15 During
EFTA’s infancy (1960-1966), free trade among its member-states was
built in stages.16 At one time, EFTA had more members than did the EU/
EEC.17 However, during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, firms within the
EFTA member-states started pushing their governments to form closer
ties with the EU/EEC.18 There is some evidence that firms located outside
the EU/EEC were suffering from diminished relative competitiveness due
to the strength of the EU/EEC trade group.19
For many of the EFTA countries, EFTA membership itself was seen as
a mere stepping-stone to the EU/EEC.20 The push to form the European
Economic Area (“EEA”), a free trade association comprising both EU and
EFTA member-states, made sense in the early 1990s given that 55% of
EFTA exports went to the EU.21 Three of the four EFTA member-states,
including Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein (Switzerland, an EFTA
member but not an EEA member), found the advantages of the EU
common market too tempting and joined the EU in forming the EEA in
1992.22 Ironically, most of the EFTA member-states had applied to
become members of the EU by the time the EEA Agreement came into
effect on January 1, 1995.23 Switzerland most likely rejected membership in
the EEA because of its cultural tradition of neutrality, despite the fact that
it sends one-third of its exports to, and receives two-thirds of its imports
from, the EU.24 Nevertheless, the 1992 negotiations did not lead to a
larger EU due to a lack of confidence in the political position of EFTA
countries on the part of the EU member-states.25 In 2009, Iceland applied

15. Kristian Steinnes, Socialist Party Networks in Northern Europe: Moving Towards
the EEC Applications of 1967, in THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A
TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950-62, supra note 6, at 93 (Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte
Leucht & Morten Rasmussen eds. 2009).
16. DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 97.
17. ANDREAS STAAB, THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS,
GLOBAL IMPACT 31 (2d ed. 2011).
18. BALDWIN & WYPLOSZ, supra note 3, at 25.
19. Id. at 17.
20. DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 118.
21. MCCORMICK & OLSEN, supra note 8, at 81.
22. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 39.
23. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 6 (7th ed.
2010).
24. NEAL, supra note 14, at 318.
25. DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 117.
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to become a member-state of the EU due to the instability of its financial
system, but has recently recanted its desire to join the EU.26
The EU is the world’s largest single market alone with an estimated 496
million consumers, and thus, following the addition of the three EFTA
countries, the 30 member-states of the EEA would clearly be considered
the largest single market.27 Countries in Europe not belonging to the EEA
will suffer as their citizens and firms will feel the effects of tariffs and
quotas.28 Such an impact may serve as an incentive to join the EU or EFTA
and later the EEA.29 Other applicant and candidate countries to the EU
such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro as well
as other possible EU-candidate countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine could further enlarge the EEA.30
The EEA has both a general objective and an economic objective. The
general objective is to work toward continuous economic relations aided
by the development of a common set of rules for trade and competition.31
The economic objective is to extend the EU’s common market rules to the
three EFTA member-states that are part of the EEA.32 Thus, the provisions
that ensure non-discrimination with regard to the origin of goods traded
from one member-state of the EEA to another member-state are of great
importance.33
Although the EEA can generally be considered an extension of the EU,
the professionals working in this field should constantly review the
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the EFTA Court to make sure that the rules
of the common market are being interpreted harmoniously.34 The EEA’s
enactment gave birth to the EFTA Court, a separate court from the ECJ,
which has a mission to determine whether an EFTA member-state has
violated its obligations under the EEA and to provide advisory opinions
26. STAAB, supra note 17, at 41. Anna Molin, Iceland Says It Has No Plans For
EU Membership, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:11PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
iceland-says-it-has-no-plans-for-eu-membership-1426198286?KEYWORDS=iceland+euro
pean+union.
27. THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 31 (5th ed. 2012).
28. NEAL, supra note 14, at 43.
29. Id.
30. RONALD H. LINDEN, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 137–38 (Sharon L.
Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds. 2011).
31. TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 39.
32. Id. at 39, 41.
33. Id.
34. CHRISTOPHER STOTHERS, PARALLEL TRADE IN EUROPE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
COMPETITION AND REGULATORY LAW 423 (2007).

79

TUDORADA (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2016 1:50 PM

to national courts on the same subject.35 The EFTA Court maintains
similar rules of procedure to those of the ECJ.36 For example, both EFTA
Court and ECJ do not allow for dissenting opinions.37 At one time, there
existed a proposal for an all-competent “EEA Court” but in 1991 the ECJ
found that provision of the EEA Agreement in violation of EU law.38 The
ECJ’s greatest concern was that the EEA Court would have sole jurisdiction
to interpret the EEA Agreement.39 This reality leads to the possibility
that EEA law and EU law may not be harmonized.40
The ECJ should, with some exceptions, interpret the EEA as it would
TFEU.41 There is really no one court that maintains the competence to
determine the proper interpretation of the EEA Agreement.42 It is generally
accepted that EEA law, through EFTA Court decisions, does not impact
the case law of the ECJ.43 It is unclear, however, what impact the ECJ has
on the case law of the EFTA Court when the ECJ interprets the EEA
Agreement.44 When the ECJ and the EFTA Court interpretations differ,
the EEA Joint Committee, which is entrusted to constantly monitor the
development of case law on both sides, can take action to promote
consistency in the EEA.45 However, the EEA Joint Committee cannot
alter the case law of either the ECJ or the EFTA Court. 46 The EFTA
Surveillance Authority is also empowered to avoid legal imbalances
between the EFTA and EU member-states.47 The Surveillance Authority
operates much like the European Commission for reasons of homogeneity
and credibility with its counterpart.48
C. Article 11 of the EEA and Article 34 of the TFEU
Article 11 of the EEA is a mirror image of Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of The
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits a memberstate of the EEA from imposing regulations that create quantitative restrictions

35.
36.

TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 45.
NIELS FENGER ET AL., EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA)
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA (EEA) 115 (2012).
37. Id. at 115–16.
38. HARTLEY, supra note 23, at 5.
39. Id.
40. See FENGER, ET AL., supra note 36, at 59.
41. See id. at 75.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id. at 75.
45. See id. at 76.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 57.
48. Id. at 58.
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on imports or any measure that has the equivalent effect.49 Likewise,
Article 13 of the EEA is a mirror image of Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of TFEU.
Article 13 modifies Article 11 in that it allows for quantitative restrictions on
grounds such as public morality or public policy, for example, but in any
case, cannot constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination. 50 In other
words, Articles 13 and 36 serve as a set of permissible exceptions to
the bars put forth in Articles 11 and 34 of the EEA and the Treaty,
respectively.
III. PURPOSE OF THIS WORK
The goal of this work is to determine whether the EFTA Court is
meeting its obligations by interpreting the EEA in accordance with the
existing jurisprudence of the ECJ with regard to quantitative restrictions
on imports. This work will present case law that reflects a condition of
differing jurisprudence on the same topics. If such a condition does exist,
the law of the EEA and the law of the EU become separated, leaving
member-states, lawyers, government officials, and businesses to question
the status of the law within the EEA, generally. More narrowly, these
49. Article 10 and Article 11 of the EEA states: “Quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between the Contracting
Parties”; “Without prejudice to the arrangements in Protocol 5, this shall also apply to
customs duties of a fiscal nature.” Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of the TFEU states: “Quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited
between the Member States.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union art. 34, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 61 [hereinafter TFEU].
50. Article 13 of the EEA states:
The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 shall not prelude prohibitions or restrictions
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality,
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties.
Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU reads:
the provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality,
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
TFEU art. 36.
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individuals and entities will be left to question the law on quantitative
restrictions on imports, specifically, in Europe. Another purpose of this
work is to explore some of the arguments that a member-state might put
forth in an attempt to maintain a quantitative restriction in an effort to
promote its own interests.
IV. CASE LAW ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM THE ECJ
A. Certificate of Authenticity
The decision by the ECJ in Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville serves as
one of the early, bedrock cases showing little tolerance for any attempt by
a member-state to enact regulations that limit trade under the TFEU.51
Although the ECJ’s opinion was short, its holding was concrete: a
member-state’s requirement that an importer obtain a certificate of
authenticity before importing goods into a member-state that were
already in free circulation in another member-state was a violation of
Article 34’s (ex 28, 30) prohibition against quantitative restrictions on
imported goods.52 In Dassonville, importers were criminally charged by
the Belgian government after importing (into Belgium) Scotch whisky
they had acquired in free circulation in France, without first obtaining a
certificate of authenticity.53 The required certificate would have, according
to the Belgian government, served as a source of consumer protection as
potential buyers would know what exactly they were purchasing.54 The
Court’s rationale in striking the Belgian rule focused on the difficulty that
the trader would have in obtaining the certificate, which, in this case,
would have to come from the British government.55
B. Pricing
The ECJ in Criminal Proceedings Against Keck offered to support
domestic legislation and stated that its rulings in Dassonville and ReweZentral did not apply to a French law that prohibited the resale of goods
at a level below cost.56 In Keck, two supermarket retailers that sold both
beer and coffee products at below cost argued that Article 34 (ex 28, 30)

51. Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.
52. Id. ¶ 9.
53. Id. ¶ 3.
54. Id. ¶ 6.
55. Id. ¶ 4.
56. Case C-267/91 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and Mithouard,
1993 E.C.R. I-6097, 6131.
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and Article 18 (ex 12, 6) should prohibit application of the French law.57
They argued that the French law limited the free movement of goods by
removing a sales strategy, thereby limiting the traders’ competitiveness,
as traders in other member-states did not have to contend with such laws.58
Although admitting that the French law might indirectly cause a
reduction in cross-border trade, the ECJ upheld the law, stating that TFEU
applies only to the movement of goods, not marketing, and the French law
permissibly dealt only with the marketing of goods within a memberstate.59 Moreover, the ECJ did not find that the French law went as far as
meeting Article 34’s “equivalent effect.”60 The Court felt that there was
a need to clarify its jurisprudence since the ECJ was concerned that
retailers and traders were relying on Article 34 too often to attack
domestic rules that interfered with their commercial freedom.61 Thus, the
ECJ stated that domestic rules that address selling arrangements do not
violate Articles 34 and 18.62
C. Product Contents, Composition, and Licensing
The ECJ has also held that a member-state’s requirement that imported
alcoholic beverages have a minimum alcohol content violates Article 34.63
In Rewe-Zentral, the ECJ entertained three arguments put forth by the
German government as to why a 1922 statute requiring minimum alcohol
content for imports did not violate TFEU. First, Germany argued that the
requirement advanced public health by limiting the spread of low-level
alcohol products, which actually tend to induce greater alcohol tolerance
in comparison to their high-level alcohol counterparts.64 Second, the
German government contended that its domestic rule was necessary in
order to guard against unfair competition; because alcohol is the most
57. Id. at I-6124.
58. See id. Article 18 (ex 12, 6) of the TFEU states: “Within the scope of application
of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. The European Parliament and
the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt rules
designed to prohibit such discrimination.” TFEU art. 18.
59. Id. at I-6129.
60. Id. at I-6131.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 3
C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979).
64. Id. at 509.
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expensive ingredient in an alcoholic beverage, low-level alcohol producers
would have a comparative advantage in the marketplace without the
rule.65 Third, Germany argued that if member-states must allow imported
alcoholic beverages with any alcohol content into circulation, the real
regulation would come from the producing countries that are permitted to
adopt domestic production rules.66 Thus, an EU-wide importation standard
of minimum alcohol content would inevitably develop based on the
member-state with the lowest minimum alcohol content level for purposes
of production.67
The ECJ dismissed Germany’s arguments, and emphasized the use and
value of consumer protection law to combat Germany’s marketplace
fears.68 As the ECJ stated, consumer protection law requires an indication
of both origin and alcohol content on the exterior packaging.69 Accordingly,
the Court held that once alcoholic beverages are legally produced and
marketed in one of the member-states, barriers must not preclude intermember-state trade of those products.70 Although the ECJ did not address
the point specifically, it should be noted that part of the plaintiff’s
argument was that if the German law were upheld, member-states could
decrease the likelihood through domestic regulation that traditional goods
such as those unique to a member-state and produced in that one memberstate will cross borders.71
The ECJ has recognized that the protection of the environment is a
credible cause that can lead to a viable quantitative restriction on imports
by a member-state.72 However, in Re Disposable Beer Cans, the ECJ held
that any such restriction must strike a proportionate in a balance between
policies encouraging free trade and a concern for environmental health.73
Here, the ECJ struck down a Danish law requiring that importers of both
beer and soft drink cans to package their products in a pre-approved
reusable container, holding that it violated Article 34 (ex 28, 30).74 The
ECJ’s rationale in this case was similar to its decision in Rewe-Zentral, as
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 509–10.
70. Id. at 510–11.
71. Id. at 496. Additionally, it should be added that the 1922 law did not apply to
low-alcohol beverages that were produced in Germany. Id. at 494.
72. See generally Case C-240/83, Ass’n de Defense des Bruleurs D’Huiles Usagees,
1985-2 1 E.C.R. 531.
73. Case C-302/86, Comm’n v. Denmark (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607
(1989).
74. Id. at 632. The Danish law did allow the first 3,000 hl of beer or soft drink
product per producer to be imported in a non-approved container. Id. at 630.
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it focused on the additional expense that an importer would have to incur
by choosing a Danish government pre-approved container.75 Although the
ECJ sympathized with the Danish government’s attempt at preserving the
environment, the ECJ found that there were other, less restrictive ways to
accomplish the same goal.76 For example, the law could simply require
importers to show that their containers could be reused without forcing
them to use a preapproved container.77
The arguments supporting the “public health” clause of Article 36 (ex
30, 36) were likely exhausted by the German government in Re Purity
Requirements for Beer, where the ECJ struck down a combination of
German laws that made it difficult for foreign beer producers to import
into Germany under the designation of “Bier” and thus are a violation of
Article 34 (ex 28, 30).78
The German law imposed numerous requirements on beer producers
before any beer product could become eligible for sale in Germany. For
example, German beer production regulation required specific ingredients
for both “bottom-fermented” beers, (malted barley, hops, yeast, and water)
and “top-fermented” beers (malts, pure cane sugar, and other sugars).79 In
addition to the required set of ingredients, another body of German law
prohibited the use of additives in products that were to be sold as “Bier.”80
However, it was possible for the German government to grant an
exception based on a specific list.81
The German government defended this collection of purity laws on
several grounds. First, the government argued that the ban on additives
was necessary to ensure public health—the ECJ found this argument
hollow, as Germany put forth virtually zero limits on additives in soft
drinks.82 In response, Germany contended that additives in beer pose a
greater danger for Germans because beer is consumed in such large
quantities, compared to soft drinks, and that the long-term health effects

75. Id. at 631.
76. Id. at 632.
77. Id. at 632.
78. Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1 C.M.L.R. 780, 801–03,
811 (1988).
79. Id. at 801.
80. Id. at 802. The German law also defined the term “additive.” Id.
81. Id. at 801. The list of exceptions included the manufacture of special beers,
beers for export, and beer intended for scientific experiments. Id.
82. Id. at 805, 808.
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of these additives, especially in conjunction with alcohol, is unknown.83
Although the ECJ seemed more sympathetic to this latter argument, it
found the rule in question to be disproportionate since the German
government did not ban the use of the additives in other food products.84
The second argument put forth by the German government was the
more traditional consumer protection argument. The government asserted
that the German population attaches the term “Bier” to a specific product
made with specific ingredients identified by German law.85 The ECJ
rejected this argument by stating that labeling requirements could adequately
protect consumers and allow them to make an informed choice.86 Again,
the German government countered. Germany argued that not all beer
containers could adequately fit a label that includes all of the ingredients
and further, that products sold on draft the labels would actually require
the labels to be located on the taps.87 The ECJ found that such a system
would be adequate and that German law could be developed as to give
consumers the necessary information in other ways.88
The ECJ returned to cost concerns for manufacturers to strike down
domestic law in the face of Article 34 (ex 28, 30) in Re the Use of
Champagne-Type Bottles.89 Here, the case concerned the importation into
Germany of Petillant de Raisin, which is an alcoholic beverage with an
alcohol content of rarely more than 3%, but was sold in a champagne-style
bottle in violation of Germany’s Wine Act.90 The German government
argued that by allowing the importer to sell this product in Germany
packaged in such a bottle, consumers would be easily confused into believing
they are were purchasing champagne.91 The ECJ rejected the government’s
argument by stating that producers of Petillant de Raisin, which is
traditionally packaged in a champagne bottle in the country of origin,
would face higher costs in that they would have to choose a bottle that
would fit only the German market.92 As well, the ECJ contended that simple
labeling requirements would be adequate to protect against consumer
confusion.93 The Court did not believe Article 36 (ex 30, 36) permitted
83. Id. at 808–09.
84. Id. at 810.
85. Id. at 807.
86. Id. at 807–08.
87. Id. at 808.
88. Id.
89. Case C-179/85, Comm’n v. Germany (Re the Use of Champagne-Type Bottles),
1 C.M.L.R. 135, 144 (1988).
90. Id. at 141–42.
91. Id. at 143.
92. See id. at 142–43. One could only imagine the additional costs for importers
that forced into using a separate designed bottle for each and every member-state.
93. Id.
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Germany’s request that the producer/importer of Petillant de Raisin prove
that it could not afford the additional costs of a different bottle.94
In Ahokainen and Leppik, the ECJ stated that it was up to national courts
to decide whether a Finnish rule requiring a license to import beverages
with alcohol content above 80% could be justified under Article 36 (ex
30, 36).95 Specifically, the ECJ stated that national courts should have the
ability to determine whether the licensing system was the least restrictive
measure a member-state could employ to mitigate the public health concerns
associated with high rates of alcoholism in Finland, especially among
youths.96
Nevertheless, the ECJ had no trouble finding that the alcohol import
licensing system employed by Finland was indeed a violation of Article
34’s (ex 28, 30) prohibition on regulations limiting the free movement of
goods.97 When discussing the balance between Articles 34 and 36, the
ECJ acknowledged that the mere imposition of an import licensing system
on goods that are legal and made and marketed within the EU memberstates could impose a cost to the importer that serves as an obstacle to the
free movement of goods.98 However, according to the ECJ, in order to
support a restriction under Article 36, a member-state must put forth
evidence that the restrictive measure is proportional to the objective sought
and that there is no discrimination between imported and domestically
produced goods.99 The ECJ did not find Finland’s alcohol import licensing
scheme to be per se discriminatory.100
While the ECJ left open the possibility that Finland’s alcohol import
policy would stand (by leaving the question to the member-state national
courts), the ECJ remarked that the domestic court could take into
consideration particular social circumstances unique to the regulating
member-state.101 The ECJ made these findings despite case law cited by
the ECJ that previously held that such licensing systems could be

94. Id. at 144.
95. Case C-434/04, Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik v. Finland, 2006
E.C.R. I-9171, ¶ 39.
96. Id. ¶¶ 25, 39–40.
97. Id. ¶ 22.
98. Id. ¶ 35.
99. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.
100. Id. ¶ 30.
101. Id. ¶ 32.
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disproportionate to a member-state’s goals, even with regard to the protection
of human health.102
The ECJ has held that a member-state cannot prohibit the marketing of
foodstuffs containing added vitamins and minerals when those same
foodstuffs are lawfully produced and marketed in other member-states
unless there is proof of a public health risk by the prohibiting memberstate pursuant to Articles 34 (ex 28, 30) and 36 (ex 30, 36).103 In the case
at bar, Denmark prohibited the importation of enriched foodstuffs unless
the importer’s product(s) were shown to include nutrients that were
needed by the Danish population.104 First, the government of Denmark
defended the prohibition by contending that the safety of the vitamins and
minerals that served to enrich the imported foodstuffs could not be
determined with sufficient certainty.105 Second, the Danish government
argued that the imported foodstuffs are not necessary because they do not
meet a real dietary need in Denmark.106 Third, while not disputing the
fact that the ban would serve as the equivalent to a quantitative measure,
the Danish government argued that a member-state need not establish a
real risk associated with the relevant product because doing so, according
to the government, would be impossible.107 More narrowly, Denmark
contended that ingesting great amounts of the enriching vitamins and
minerals could be severe enough that the danger to human health could
not be excluded even if scientific research was not able to clearly identify
risk or the absence thereof.108
The European Commission, which brought the complaint, believed that
the Danish prohibition was an “unjustified obstacle,” pursuant to Articles
34 and 36, because a lack of nutritional need was not a sufficient basis for
prohibition.109 Rather, the European Commission argued, a prohibiting
member-state should have the burden of showing that such products pose
a real threat to public health.110 According to the European Commission,
the prohibiting member-state must present scientific data supporting the
existence of a real threat to public health as a basis for prohibition.111

102. Id. ¶ 34.
103. Case C-192/01, Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶¶ 48, 57.
104. Id. ¶ 1.
105. Id. ¶ 14. However, the Danish government did cite that the mix of vitamins A,
D, and B6, even in low doses, could have a toxic effect. Id. ¶ 32.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 16.
108. Id. ¶ 29.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.
111. Id. ¶ 15.
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Moreover, without such proof, Article 36 could not support such a ban.112
The European Commission also contended that any such prohibition on the
importation of enriched foodstuffs should be necessary for the protection
of public health.113
The ECJ began its decision with the traditional language that the free
movement of goods is fundamental to TFEU and that any quantitative
restrictions, or their equivalents, would violate Article 34.114 After quickly
holding that the Danish law has the equivalent effect of a quantitative
restriction on the free movement of goods under Article 34, the ECJ stated
that member-states have significant discretion in determining what is
necessary for public health, especially in cases where EU law has not been
harmonized.115 Regardless, according to the ECJ, strict compliance with
Article 36 requires member-states to narrowly tailor prohibitions so that
they prohibit only that which is absolutely necessary to maintain public
health, and show that less restrictive alternative measures are insufficient.116
The ECJ set the burden of proof bar at a level whereby the prohibiting
member-state must show that international scientific research involving
the member-state’s nutritional habits reflects a need to for the prohibition of
such foodstuffs.117 Furthermore, such proof requires a detailed assessment of
the risks maintained associated by with the foodstuffs’ entry into the
member-state’s marketplace.118 As well, the scientific research must be
current to show that the prohibition was needed at the time the ban was
enacted.119 However, the ECJ did give member-states room to evaluate
the addition of foodstuffs into the current national diet, the varying quantity
of added nutrients, the various sources of nutrients and their cumulative
effect (despite whether they are from a natural or unnatural source), and
the actual dietary needs of the population.120 While finding that the
Danish law was disproportionate to the perceived need to protect public
health, the ECJ stated that the law should fail largely due to the fact that

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
Id. ¶¶ 40, 42–43.
Id. ¶¶ 45, 46.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id. ¶ 48.
Id. ¶¶ 48, 50, 54.
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the government did not specify the risks associated with each vitamin and
minerals to public health.121
In a case that reflected Italy’s love for pasta, the ECJ held in Criminal
Proceedings Against Zoni that a member-state cannot prohibit the importation
of pasta that is made from raw ingredients that are not normally used
in that member-state on the grounds of consumer protection and unknown
health effects.122 At the time the case arose, the law on pasta in Italy
provided that dry pasta made from common wheat or a mixture of common
wheat and durum wheat could not be imported into Italy. 123 However,
common wheat pasta could be used for export and small-scale preparation
of fresh pasta (for immediate consumption).124 Zoni, the defendant, after
being charged with importing pasta made from a combination of common
wheat and durum wheat in Germany, argued the Italian law violated the
free movement of goods requirement under Article 34 (ex 28, 30) and
could not be tolerated as derogation under Article 36 (ex 30, 36).125
Italy attempted to defend its pasta law on several grounds. First, the
Italian government argued that common wheat pasta or pasta made from
a mixture of different types of wheat is generally mixed with additives
and colorants to create a particular color and flavor which, if ingested in
large quantities, could create harmful effects on humans.126 Second, Italy
believed it to be necessary to require that all dry pasta be made from
durum wheat in order to protect Italian consumers by maintaining a
superior quality of pasta. 127 Third, Italy believed that requiring labels
reflecting the raw ingredients in the marketed pasta would not suffice
since, in Italy, the term “pasta” presupposes that the pasta purchased is
made from durum wheat.128 Fourth, Italy stated that even with labeling
requirements, it would not be possible for Italian consumers to actually
check the accuracy of the labeling.129 Fifth, the Italian government argued
that by requiring dry pasta to be made from durum wheat, the government
was guaranteeing income for durum wheat growers who might otherwise
only grow common wheat and consequently eliminate durum wheat from
the marketplace.130

121.
122.
28.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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Id. ¶ 55.
Case C-90/86, Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. I-4285, ¶¶ 20,
Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4.
Id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶¶ 2, 6.
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After quickly finding that the Italian law constituted an equivalent to a
quantitative restriction pursuant to Article 34, the ECJ turned its attention to
the many arguments put forth by Italy as the government attempted to
save its pasta law.131 First, the ECJ noted that Italy had no evidence that
common wheat pasta or mixed pasta would contain additives or
colorants. 132 Second, the ECJ found the Italian pasta law violated the
principle of proportionality because it was not necessary to ban common
wheat or mixed pasta in an attempt to protect human health.133 Third, the
ECJ gave much more credence to the ability of labels, a less restrictive
alternative, to inform Italian consumers of the contents of dry pasta when
they make purchasing decisions.134 The ECJ also commented that Italy
could require highly detailed labels.135 Finally, the ECJ remarked that
differences in pasta should exist in the marketplace and that consumer
preferences should be allowed to dictate the winning pasta through
competition and not the fear of loss of a specific type of wheat grown in
Italy.136
In a similar case, the ECJ found that a German law prohibiting the
importation and domestic sale of meat products that contained ingredients
other than meat infringed upon Articles 34 (ex 28, 30) and 36 (ex 30,
36).137 In the case at bar, the German government attempted to defend its
importation ban on such products as it was necessary to protect the health
of German consumers by making sure that the population ingests sufficient
amounts of protein.138 Moreover, the German government argued that
vegetable proteins, presumably added to meat products, have a lower
nutritional value than strict meat proteins in all-meat products.139 Third,
Germany stated that German eating habits, which have existed for several
decades, require strict meat products and that this is what German consumers
have come to expect. 140 Lastly, the German government contended that
131. Id. ¶ 11.
132. Id. ¶ 13.
133. Id. ¶ 14.
134. Id. ¶ 16.
135. Id. ¶¶ 17, 20. Such a label could be “pasta made from durum wheatmeal.” Id.
¶ 17. The ECJ also commented that the Italian government also uses pasta in a generic
form so that pasta does not infer that it is made from only durum wheat. Id. at ¶ 20.
136. Id. ¶ 27.
137. Case C-274/87, Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R. 229, ¶¶ 2, 23.
138. Id. ¶ 7.
139. Id. ¶ 10.
140. Id. ¶ 12.
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the ban was necessary in order to protect producers and distributors of
meat products from unfair competition as some meat-product traders may
market meat products that have non-meat ingredients and will undercut
higher-grade producers and that consumers would not readily see the
differences.141
The ECJ, while acknowledging the primacy of a member-state’s
obligation and duty to protect human health, first cited the German
government’s own reports detailing that the protein intake of the German
population was more than adequate.142 The ECJ also stated that importation
bans such as Germany’s ban on meat products with non-meat ingredients
cannot be justified under Article 36 on grounds that the imports will have
a lower nutritional content than what is currently on the market, since
consumers should be able to maintain choices regarding nutritional value.143
Next, the ECJ contended that any consumer confusion as to the true content
of meat products could be removed through the compulsory requirement
of labels on the products’ packaging.144 In regard to the protection of
German meat producers and distributors, the ECJ again believed that
compulsory labeling of meat products would be ample to inform consumers.145
D. Obscenity
Conegate Limited v. HM Customs forced the ECJ to address geographical
differences within the same member-state on the subject of public
morality.146 In Conegate Limited, a German-based importer challenged a
British restriction on the importation of inflatable sex dolls and other
sexual items that were deemed indecent or obscene.147 Although the ECJ
articulated that a member-state is free to dictate its own standards when
defining public morality, the United Kingdom—comprised of England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—maintained different rules as to
whether those same inflatable sex dolls were lawful.148
The question for the ECJ was whether a member-state could exercise a
restriction on the importation of indecent or obscene items when, at the
same time, no general prohibition existed on the manufacture or sale of
those same items within the member-state, even when the regulation of

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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those items varied by political region.149 The ECJ answered the question
in the negative and stated that Article 36 (ex 30, 36) would not support
public morality derogation in such circumstances even when, despite the
differences in regulation across political regions, there did exist a general
prohibition on some forms of advertising.150 Moreover, the ECJ reminded
the litigants that under no circumstances could a member-state impose
regulations on imports that are stricter than those imposed on domestically
produced goods.151 However, the ECJ did state that once the goods from
Germany were imported into the United Kingdom, the same general
restrictions on marketing and advertising would apply to the imported
goods as they apply to the domestically produced goods.152
E. Advertising
In Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, the ECJ upheld,
pursuant to Article 36 (ex 30, 36) (and specifically on public health
grounds), a German advertising ban on pharmaceuticals imported into
Germany whereby the same pharmaceuticals that were not authorized in
Germany could be imported into Germany. 153 In the case at bar, one
pharmaceutical firm, Lucien Ortscheit, attempted to block the importation of
pharmaceuticals advertised by Eurim-Pharm, another pharmaceutical
firm, using a German law that prohibited the advertising of such unauthorized
pharmaceuticals.154 Interestingly enough, the German ban on advertising
applied to pharmaceuticals that were authorized for sale in another
member-state but were not authorized in Germany.155 Eurim-Pharm, for
several years, had been marketing pharmaceuticals in Germany that were
not authorized by the German government in advertisements, which
specifically identified which pharmaceuticals were not authorized in
Germany, directed at healthcare professionals.156
Although not specifically identified in the case, but revealed in the
ECJ’s description of the Advocate General’s position, the German government
149. Id. ¶ 13.
150. Id. ¶ 20.
151. Id. ¶ 12.
152. See id. ¶ 21.
153. Case C-390/23, Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1994 E.C.R.
I-5257, ¶¶ 12, 20–21.
154. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
155. Id. ¶ 4.
156. Id. ¶ 6.
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defended the advertising ban on public health grounds; more specifically,
that individual importation of unauthorized pharmaceuticals would remain
infrequent and manufacturers could not gain approval for such pharmaceuticals
in member-states where fewer requirements existed.157 While supporting
the German advertising ban, the ECJ made note that given the lack of
harmonization in the area of pharmaceutical advertising, member-states
maintained much more discretion in crafting regulations on the marketing
and advertising of pharmaceutical products.158 This position taken by the
ECJ coincided with the reminder that the protection of human health is
among the most important interests protected by Article 36 despite the
acknowledgement that such an advertising ban would limit the ability of
healthcare providers to have access to information about the existence and
availability pharmaceuticals that can actually be used in Germany.159
F. Health Screening
Whether a member-state can impose a higher standard for public health
than what is established by EU law pursuant to Article 36 (ex 30, 36) was
the question presented in Austria v. Hahn.160 EU law on the marketing of
fish products was found in Directive 91/493/EEC, which required that
such products caught in a natural environment would be subject to various
health checks, including organoleptic, parasite, chemical, and microbiological
evaluations.161 Additionally, Directive 91/493/EEC required that these
checks take place in any place whereby fish products were “prepared,
processed, chilled, frozen, packaged, or stored.”162 However, despite this
specificity, the Directive did not identify standards for member-states to
follow.163 EU Decision 94/356, which compliments Directive 91/493/EEC,
however, did specify that potential hazards associated with fish products
would include unacceptable contamination through biological organisms,
chemicals, other raw materials, other final products, and/or contamination
through a production line.164 Moreover, Decision 94/356 provided that
multidisciplinary teams should consider what control measures to put in
place and that such control measures should be employed to pre vent
health hazards.165

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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Austrian law, however, was much more specific on the topic of fish
related products. Austrian law prohibited the marketing of foodstuffs and
products intended for human consumption that are likely to endanger or harm
human health.166 More specifically, Austrian law provided a “zero tolerance”
policy in regard to contamination of food products by way of listeria
monocytogenes in that if this form of contamination was detected at
greater than 25 grams, the fish products could not be marketed in Austria,
as they would be deemed harmful to human health.167
Nordsee GmbH, the defendant in the case, was charged with violating
the Austrian standards on fish products.168 Nordsee contended that
Austria’s identification of fish products as harmful to human health if they
contained listeria monocytogenes at 25 grams or more (per sample size)
was the equivalent to a quantitative restriction in violation of Article 34
and could not be saved by Article 36 since the restriction was n ot
proportionate even in cases where EU law had not been harmonized.169
Nordsee cited a 1996 U.S. Center for Disease Control study finding that
very few persons that ingested even low levels of listeria monocytogenes
became ill and thus the Austrian standard was too strict, and therefore, an
equivalent to a quantitative restriction existed.170
The Austrian government, in contrast, stated that EU law, including
Directive 91/493 and Decision 94/356 did not fully harmonize EU law on
the topic of safety in fish products but merely set objectives for memberstates to follow given the terms “unacceptable contamination” and
“acceptable levels.”171
Ironically, the Austrian court that referred the case to the ECJ could not
find a scientific basis for a zero tolerance policy for listeria monocytogenes
in that such a form of contamination is wide spread in the environment
generally and in food production specifically. Even in good food production
conditions, few clinical cases of harm were realized, and it would be almost
impossible to remove listeria monocytogenes from the food production
process.172

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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Id. ¶¶ 16–18.
Id. ¶ 2.
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The ECJ held that Austria was within its power under Article 36 to
impose stricter standards to protect human health in the area of fish products,
even at a “zero tolerance” level.173 The ECJ agreed with the plaintiff that
Directive 91/493 and Decision 94/356 harmonized EU law in a way that
could prohibit member-states from setting high standards for human health
when not justified.174 Although the ECJ commented that Articles 34 and
36 do not immunize a member-state’s strict standards for protecting human
health, the doctrine of proportionality must apply to such restrictions. The
effect of the Austrian law would be to limit the trade in fish products between
member-states, and any such limitation must be based on scientific research.
The ECJ cited several health problems that current international scientific
research has identified in regard to human consumption of listeria
monocytogenes.175 As well, the ECJ stated that current research did not
identify a specific level of listeria monocytogenes that would be safe for
human consumption.176
Differences in climate can determine whether food protected with
pesticides can be blocked from importation between member-states.177 In
Mirepoix, the ECJ allowed France to block the import of fruit and
vegetables once covered with a pesticide, maleic hydrazide (a synthetic
chemical), which were grown in the Netherlands due to a French law that
prohibited the use of the pesticide because of toxic residue likely to be
found on such treated products.178 The defendant contested his prosecution
by the French authorities, arguing that the French ban on the pesticide was
a violation of the free movement of goods under Article 34 (ex 28, 30)
and the ban did not fall into the exceptions found in Article 36 (ex 30, 36).
According to the defendant, (i) there was no certainty that the pesticide
could harm humans, (ii) the French law went beyond what was necessary
to protect human health, and (iii) other methods associated with food safety
could have been implemented.179
The ECJ found that the French pesticide ban did constitute the
equivalent of a quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods, but
since the quantities ingested by consumers could not be predicted, the ECJ
held that member-states could prohibit food protected with a banned
pesticide from entering its borders.180 The ECJ went as far as to comment
173. Id. ¶ 47.
174. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
175. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 39–41. The ECJ specifically identified risks to pregnant women
and the elderly. Id. ¶ 41.
176. Id. ¶ 45.
177. Case 54/85, Ministere Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, 1986 E.C.R. 1074, ¶¶ 15, 18.
178. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 8.
179. Id. ¶ 7.
180. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.
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that a member-state can take into consideration its own climate, the normal
diet of its citizens, and the general state of health of its citizens.181
However, the ECJ did place limitations on banning products treated
with a banned pesticide. Any member-state blocking the importation of
such food products must first consider any reasons as to why the ban is no
longer necessary.182 Second, the member-state must allow for exceptions
whereby the importer may contest that the pesticide is dangerous to human
health.183
The ECJ in Humanplasma GmbH v. Austria stated that “human health
ranks foremost among the assets or interest protected by Article 36 (ex 30,
36).”184 As one can imagine, the possibility of tainted blood moving from
one member-state to another in the stream of commerce would pose a
substantial risk and therefore member-states might have the greatest
leeway for regulation. However, in Humanplasma, the ECJ found that
Austria’s requirement that all traders in blood and blood products supply
proof that all blood donors received no compensation violated Article 30’s
(ex 28, 30) prohibition against regulations that possess the equivalent
effect of a quantitative restriction and could not be saved by Article 36 (ex
30, 36).185
In a rare instance, the defending member-state—here, Austria—agreed
that the requirement that all traders in blood related products have proof
that all blood donors received no compensation was a restriction that
could limit trade in goods between member-states.186 However, the ECJ
did not find that the Austrian regulation on trade in blood products was
discriminatory.187 As well, the ECJ found that virtually all parties included
in the case at bar agreed that the true mission of the Austrian regulation
was to ensure that blood products were safe and of high quality and
encouraging voluntary, unpaid donations to which the ECJ stated were
potentially grounds for saving the regulation under Article 36.188
The ECJ, however, kept to its case law that required, even in the case
of blood products moving between and among member-states, that any
181. Id. ¶ 15.
182. Id. ¶ 16.
183. Id. ¶ 17.
184. Case C-421/09, Humanplasma GmbH v. Austria, 2010 E.C.R. I-2389, ¶ 32.
185. Id. ¶ 46. The Austrian law prohibited the importation of blood products from
compensated donors and required proof of such from importers. Id. ¶¶ 8–10, 15.
186. Id. ¶ 30.
187. Id. ¶ 28.
188. Id. ¶ 33.
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restriction on the free movement of goods must be proportional and
necessary to achieve the objective sought by the regulating member-state.189
The ECJ stated that in the area of human health protection, member-states
are afforded discretion in determining how much protection is needed, that
the level of protection needed may vary from member-state to memberstate, and the variation in protection from member-state to member-state
does not create a presumption that the more restrictive regulation is not in
compliance with EU law.190 Regardless, the fact that other member-states
do compensate blood donors for their costs and the fact that EU law
otherwise requires that blood and blood components be tested before
entering the stream of commerce, the need for traders in blood products
to obtain blood from uncompensated donors and supply proof that donors
were not compensated was not necessary to achieve the objective of
protecting human health.191
V. CASE LAW ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM
THE EFTA COURT
A. Product Contents, Composition, and Licensing
The EFTA Court relied heavily on the ECJ’s decision in Criminal
Proceedings Against Keck in adjudicating a Norwegian law requiring a
license, to be granted from a Norwegian municipality, to sell videograms.192
In Ullensaker, Nille AS, a nationwide chain of videogram sales stores,
contested the Norwegian law was a violation of Article 11 of the EEA as
a quantitative restriction on imports after a total of seven of its 120 stores
were collectively denied licenses by five different Norwegian municipalities.193
The Norwegian government argued that the licensing system, which
would grant a license to a “specialized dealer,” was necessary in order to
prohibit the sale of illegal videograms and also could be justified on cultural
grounds under Article 13 in that the individual municipalities could make sure
that there exists a diversity of videograms for sale when granting licenses.194
The Norwegian government also contended that the licensing system did not
distinguish between domestically and foreign-produced videograms.195 In
189. Id. ¶ 34.
190. Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
191. Id. ¶¶ 43–45. Many member-states provided donors with refreshments and
compensation for travel costs. Id. ¶ 44.
192. Ullensaker kommune and Others v. Nille AS, Case E-5/96, EFTA Ct. Rep. 30,
¶ 3 (May 14, 1997), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/5_96_Advisory
_Opinion_EN.pdf.
193. Id. ¶ 5.
194. Id. ¶¶ 6, 18.
195. Id. ¶ 17.

98

TUDORADA (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 17: 75, 2015]

10/7/2016 1:50 PM

Comparison of ECJ and EFTA Courts
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

contrast, Nille AS argued that the licensing system violated Article 11
because it limited the number of retail outlets for videograms and thus
constituted a quantitative restriction on videogram sales since many
videograms sold in Norway are imported.196 Nille AS also argued that the
licensing system allowed Norwegian municipalities to arbitrarily determine
who could sell videograms.197
Although the EFTA Court put forth a strong endorsement of the intent
of Article 11 of the EEA Agreement and its companion Article 34 (ex 28,
30) of TFEU, the Court found that neither article prohibits a domestic law
that regulates selling practices as long as there is no dissimilar treatment
between videograms produced domestically or abroad, which they found
to be the situation here.198 Although the EFTA Court referred the case back
to the national court for fact-finding, it held that in the event that the
national court did find a quantitative restriction in violation of Article 11,
the licensing system could not be upheld under Article 13 since “cultural
policy” is not a means for exemption and that Article 11 must be “interpreted
strictly” as is the case with its counterpart Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the
TFEU.199
In a case that involved several provisions of the EEA, the EFTA Court
held that Article 11 was not violated by the practice of Iceland’s State
Alcohol and Tobacco Company (the “ATVR”), a government monopoly
which serves as the sole customer of imported alcohol and has the
exclusive right to the retail sale of alcohol, whereby imported alcohol sold
to the ATVR must be placed on a specific ATVR-authorized pallet and
the price of the alcohol must include the price of the pallet.200 The plaintiff,
HOB-vin, argued that such a policy discriminated against importers since
domestic producers of alcohol were not obligated to use the required pallet
nor did they have to include the cost of a pallet in the cost of the alcohol,
which gives domestic producers an advantage in the marketplace.201 In
opposition, the Icelandic government argued that the pallets were
required in order to keep uniformity in terms of both warehouse operation
and price control due to the fact that if different importers used different
196. Id. ¶ 20.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶ 23.
199. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37.
200. HOB-vín v. Ice., Case E-4/05, EFTA Ct. Rep. 4, ¶¶ 38 (Jan. 17, 2006), available
at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/4_05_Judgment_EN.pdf.
201. Id. ¶ 28.

99

TUDORADA (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2016 1:50 PM

pallets, different cost structures would potentially cause discrimination among
importers.202
Instead of applying Article 11 of the EEA, the EFTA Court centered its
decision on Article 16, which requires member-state granted monopolies to
adjust their practices so that discrimination does not exist regarding the
procurement and marketing of goods made in member-states of the EEA.203
The EFTA Court held that Article 16 is not violated unless a national court
finds that the policy of the monopoly is designed to treat importers
differently from domestic producers.204
In Tore Wilhelmsen v. Oslo Kommune, the EFTA Court found that
Norway’s licensing system that favored domestic beer producers over
their foreign counterparts, and a state monopoly’s sole control over beer
with a certain alcohol by volume level was in violation of Articles 11 and
16 of the EEA.205 The plaintiff first challenged Norway’s beer classification
system following the denial of an application for a license that included
three classifications of beer whereby beer with an alcohol by volume
percentage of 4.75% or greater could only be sold by the Norwegian
state-granted monopoly. 206 However, pursuant to the classification
system, no license was necessary to sell beer with an alcohol by volume
percentage below 2.5%, and beer with an alcohol by volume percentage
of between 2.5% and 4.75% could be sold by anyone who met the general
rules for trading eligibility under Norwegian law.207 The Norwegian stategranted monopoly, which by statute was not permitted to discriminate
between suppliers and products based on country of origin, could not produce
alcoholic beverages and was therefore dependent upon seeking suppliers for
its retail outlets.208
The EFTA Court held that the 4.75% designation could be a violation
of Article 11 if the national court could find that trade patterns between
domestic and foreign producers of beer were different, even though the
EFTA Court found that the designation was set in order to develop two
separate tax schemes and not for the purpose of discriminating against

202. Id. ¶ 30.
203. Id. ¶¶ 27–38.
204. Id.
205. Tore Wilhelmsen v. Oslo Kommune, Case E-6/96, EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, ¶ 111
(June 27, 1997), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/6_96_Advisory
_Opinion_EN.pdf.
206. Id. ¶ 2.
207. See id. ¶ 3.
208. See id. ¶¶ 5, 7.
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foreign beer producers.209 However, the EFTA Court did state that if the
designation could be justified on public health grounds, Article 13 may
allow for the designation in an attempt to combat alcohol ab use.210
Regardless, the EFTA Court did not find the 4.75% designation
permissible under Article 13 in light of the ECJ’s decision in Criminal
Proceedings Against Keck.211 Additionally, the EFTA Court stated that
the Norwegian state-granted monopoly and the rules that govern its
operation could still be in violation of Articles 11 and 16 despite the fact
that, by statute, it was designed not to treat domestic and foreign beer
producers differently.212 Indeed, the EFTA Court found Article 11 to be
specifically violated since foreign beer producers were denied a license to
sell 4.75% beer while domestic producers did not have to apply for such
a license.213
Norway’s ban on the importation of fortified cornflakes was at issue in
EFTA v. Norway.214 Here, the Norwegian Food Control Authority,
exercising its power under Article 13, attempted to prohibit the
importation and marketing of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes due to the fact that
the flakes were fortified with four vitamins and minerals including
thiamine, riboflavin, niacin, and iron despite the fact that the flakes had
been widely manufactured, sold, and marketed in other EEA memberstates.215 Norway put forth several reasons justifying its ban, including
that only authorized nutrients were needed by the Norwegian population’s
diet, that extensive use of fortification would lead to an unbalanced level
of nutrients, that it would put consumers at risk if the fortified nutrients
were advertised without providing the total nutritional value of the
product, that basic foodstuffs should be manufactured only with highnutritional value raw materials, and that the addition of nutrients to cereals
was not obligatory in any Nordic country.216 The Norwegian Health Ministry
209. See id. ¶ 56–57. The Court labeled the designation a “legally neutral dividing
line” but believed that this same designation should be measured against the patterns of
beer production in different states. Id.
210. Id. ¶¶ 85, 111.
211. See id. ¶ 49–50.
212. See id. ¶¶ 65–66.
213. See id. ¶ 62.
214. EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Kingdom of Nor., Case E-3/00, EFTA Ct. Rep.
73, ¶ 1 (Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/3_00_
Judgment_EN.pdf.
215. See id. ¶ 1–2.
216. Id. ¶ 2.
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added that free fortification practices could lead to additional products on
the market that would create a risk to public health, and that the principle
of non-discrimination in the trade in goods would require a member-state
to allow the importation of all fortified food items if just one were
allowed.217
The EFTA Surveillance Authority brought a complaint against Norway
pursuant to Article 11, stating that in order for the fortified cornflakes ban
to be upheld under Article 13, Norway would have to demonstrate that the
product created a health risk.218 In reply, Norway stated that it could
produce scientific research to show that by eating fortified goods in an
uncontrollable and unforeseen amounts, a health hazard could exist, but
not that any one product alone gave rise to health hazards.219 Finally, the
Norwegian government contended that the precautionary principle could
be applied to such products because less restrictive measures, such as
labelling, would not work since consumers are unlikely to have the knowledge
necessary to calculate health effects associated with the nutrients found in
all dietary sources.220
The EFTA Court made mention that the European Commission and the
EFTA Surveillance Authority agree that nutritional need alone is not a
justification to block a product’s importation and marketing on public
health grounds.221 The Surveillance Authority also contended that the
cornflakes ban is inconsistent, since Norway has allowed other fortified
goods to be produced and marketed within its borders and that such a ban
can only be justified by way of international scientific research and the
prevailing eating habits of the member-state.222
Ultimately, the EFTA Court found that Norway’s ban on the importation
and marketing of fortified cornflakes was a violation of Article 11 and was
not permissible under Article 13.223 The EFTA Court, while determining that
the food product and its associated marketing in the case at bar was covered
under EEA Agreement, stated that an EEA member-state is authorized to
ban the importation and marketing of fortified foodstuffs so long as Article
13’s requirements are met, which can include an assessment of the Norwegian
diet.224 The EFTA Court stated that the member-state imposing a ban
based on public health should be granted leeway in doing so, but must
balance that ban with the fundamental requirements of EEA law and
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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scientific research. Further, the EFTA Court concluded that any such
decision to ban goods should be subject to judicial review.225 Moreover,
the scientific evidence must be proportionate, non-discriminatory, transparent,
and consistent with other measures taken to protect public health in that
member-state.226 According to its view of the proportionality principle, the
EFTA Court agreed with the Surveillance Authority and the European
Commission that the lack of a nutritional need cannot support an import
ban under the EEA Agreement, a particularly restrictive measure, especially
when the banned good is freely available in the EEA.227
Regarding scientific research, the EFTA Court held that insufficient,
inconclusive, and imprecise scientific conclusions cannot be used to support
the precautionary principle, and thus less restrictive measures would have
to be taken by the member-state, and further, a zero-risk policy cannot be
pursued except under the most exceptional circumstances.228 However,
although the EFTA Court found no reason to believe that Norway’s ban
was motivated by economic protectionism, it did find that the reason for
the ban was based chiefly on the lack of need in the Norwegian diet for
fortified nutrients and that if one such fortified food product were allowed
entry into Norway, others must be made eligible for import.229 It was the
EFTA Court’s belief that both grounds were faulty since the concern over
lack of need for nutrients does not address the essential elements of Article
13 and that any application for importation into a member-state can be
evaluated only on the merits of that specific good.230
EEA member-states that require building materials used in government
contracts are manufactured in that member-state also run afoul of Article
11 and Article 13.231 In Fagtun ehf, the EFTA Court found that Iceland’s
requirement that building materials (in this case, roofing elements) to be used
in a government contract to construct school buildings be approved by the
Icelandic government was an unlawful regulation serving as the equivalent
effect of a quantitative restriction that could not be saved. The EFTA
Court concluded this on the grounds that public safety concerns mandate
225. See id. ¶¶ 24–25.
226. Id. ¶ 26.
227. See id. ¶ 28.
228. See generally id. ¶¶ 30–32.
229. See id. ¶¶ 33, 35–36.
230. See id. ¶¶ 35, 37.
231. Fagtun ehf v. Government of Iceland, Case E-5/98, EFTA Ct. Rep., ¶ 37 (May
12, 1999), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/5_98_Advisory_
Opinion_EN.pdf.
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that the Icelandic government supervise the construction of those materials
given the unique weather conditions in Iceland.232
In reaching its decision, the EFTA Court first had to deal with the
preliminary issue of whether a “building committee,” which set the
parameters for the public works contract, was operating on behalf of the
government for the purposes of Article 11.233 Although the Icelandic
government tried to argue otherwise, the EFTA Court believed that the
building committee was operating on behalf of the Icelandic government, the
City of Reykjavik, and the Municipality of Mosfellsbaer, since all three
forms of government selected the members of the building committee and all
three levels of government owned the school buildings that were subject
to the regulations at bar.234
In finding that an Article 11 violation existed, the EFTA Court took
notice of several facts. First, there was no determination on the part of the
Icelandic government as to whether the roofing materials, made in Norway
and imported into Iceland, would meet the standards set by Iceland’s
building regulations, nor was there an evaluation as to whether the roofing
materials would qualify for an exemption.235 Second, the EFTA Court
noted that the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission
both believed that any such regulation that requires materials to be used in
public works contracts be manufactured in the member-state that establishes
the public works project is a form of discrimination against foreign
production. 236 Third, the EFTA Court cited case law from its own
jurisprudence, as well as the ECJ, holding that any such restrictions on the
free movement of goods, direct or indirect, actually or potentially, would
serve as an unlawful limitation of Article 11 of the EEA Agreement and
Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of TFEU.237 In the end, the EFTA Court found the
Icelandic building regulation to be a blatant form of discrimination in that
the regulation expressly favored national production and excluded all
possible use of imported goods.238
The EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission
decided that Article 13 could not save the Article 11 infraction because
the discrimination was so overt.239 Adding to that sentiment, the EFTA
Court also found that the Icelandic government should have the burden of
proof to show that only the domestically produced roofing elements could
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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provide the necessary protection in Iceland’s weather, which the government
failed to achieve.240
B. Advertising
The enforcement of a copyright, even in an attempt to protect the health
and safety of potential users of a pharmaceutical, cannot be justified under
Article 13.241 In Astra Norge, the namesake plaintiff brought proceedings
against the Norwegian government to prohibit the latter from issuing
Summaries of Product Characteristics (“SPC”) on Astra Norge’s products
that were brought into Norway through parallel import.242 Specifically,
Astra Norge stated that it had a national copyright on the SPC it prepared
that could not be duplicated by the Norwegian government as was Norway’s
practice in an attempt to comply with its own Medicinal Products Act,
which required an SPC on all imported medicinal products.243 It is implied,
but not specifically stated in the case, that if Astra Norge could enforce its
copyright on the SPC it created and prevent the Norwegian government
from applying it to parallel imports, the parallel importer would be prohibited
from operating in the Norwegian market.
The EFTA Court’s opinion largely focused on the issue concerning a
potential limitation on the free movement of goods in violation of Article
11 through an assertion of a copyright, instead of the public health concern
that might justify an exception to Article 11 through Article 13.244 Both
the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission contended
that the enforcement of a copyright on behalf of Astra Norge would be a
violation of Article 11’s free movement guarantee and could not be saved
under Article 13’s set of exceptions.245
According to the EFTA Court, and pursuant to European Union
Directive 83/570/EEC, the purpose of an SPC was to protect a consumer’s
health through an authorization system whereby any medicinal product
would have to possess an SPC to be eligible for sale in a member-state,
and while the manufacturer of the drug product can write the SPC, the
240. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
241. Norwegian Government v. Astra Norge AS, Case E-1/98, EFTA Ct. Rep. 140,
¶ 26 (Nov. 24, 1998), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/1_98
_Advisory_Opinion_EN.pdf.
242. Id. ¶ 4.
243. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 15.
244. Id. ¶ 14.
245. Id. ¶ 15.
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contents of the SPC are dictated by EU law. 246 This position was in
contrast to that of Astra Norge, which argued that the SPC was largely a
function of marketing and advertising.247 While finding that Article 13
could not save the assertion of copyright by Astra Norge, the EFTA Court
stated that without the ability to allow the Norwegian government to use
the SPC from the original manufacturer/importer and place it on the
equivalent drug that is brought into Norway by way of a parallel import,
the parallel importer would be faced with the costs of drafting a new SPC,
applying for approval of the SPC, and hiring a qualified pharmacist to
participate in the process.248 Moreover, the EFTA Court stated that it might
be impossible for the parallel importer to draft an SPC that is sufficiently
new and different so as to not infringe on the manufacturer-direct importer’s
copyright.249 The EFTA Court also contended that since the drug was the
same, regardless of whether it was directly imported or imported in a
parallel fashion, the same SPC on both sets of drugs would be desirable
from a public health standpoint.250 In the end, the EFTA Court believed
that the assertion of a copyright in such fashion would be incompatible
with EEA law.251
The link between advertising and the use of tobacco was the subject of
Phillip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State.252 In Phillip Morris,
the Norwegian government had instituted a ban on advertising tobacco
products as far back as 1973, but in the case at bar, the issue was whether the
2009 ban on visual display advertising constituted an unlawful
quantitative restriction on imports given that, although the ban applied to
all tobacco products, importers of tobacco products would be at a disadvantage
since firms that at one time produced tobacco products in Norway would
have an unfair advantage due to brand loyalty.253
The EFTA Court, in routine fashion, sought to address two questions.
The first question was whether the prohibition on the visual display of
tobacco products constituted an illegal measure having the equivalent
effect of a quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods pursuant
246. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The EFTA Court did state that a member-state governmental
authority could also write the SPC. Id. ¶ 19.
247. Id. ¶ 20.
248. Id. ¶ 22.
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.
251. Id. ¶ 22.
252. Philip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State, Case E-16/10, Judgment,
European Free Trade Area Court, EFTA Ct. Rep. 330, ¶ 4 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/16_10_Judgment_EN.pdf.
253. Id. ¶¶ 2–5. The 1973 advertising ban covered all advertising of tobacco products in
all forms of media. Id. ¶ 2. The 2009 visual display ban had one exception for “dedicated
tobacco boutiques.” Id. ¶ 5.
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to Article 11.254 Phillip Morris, the plaintiff, put forth several arguments
as to why the EFTA Court should find a violation of Article 11. First, the
plaintiff stated that, although no tobacco production existed in Norway by
2009 and the visual display ban was designed to apply to all products both
domestic and imported, the visual display ban would favor domestic products
over imported products since consumers would be more familiar with the
former and this form of discrimination would be more punitive toward
imported products.255 Second, and related, since a complete media advertising
ban existed, the only way in which to communicate information to consumers
was to utilize a visual display in a retail outlet.256
Norway contended that the purpose of the visual display ban was to
reduce tobacco consumption, recognizing a link between the advertising
of tobacco and tobacco use, especially in regard to young persons and
children.257 Norway also argued that neither EU, nor EEA law (although
both addressed the advertising of tobacco) addressed visual displays, and
thus EEA member-states have the ability to impose stricter rules.258 Third,
Norway stated that the visual ban is not discriminatory in that it does not
affect the free movement of goods and is instead the mere regulation of a
selling arrangement.259
The EFTA Surveillance Authority stated that Norway’s visual display
ban was a regulation on a selling arrangement that applied to all traders,
both domestic and foreign, and thus no discrimination existed. 260 The
European Commission felt that the visual display ban was a “more radical
form of an advertising ban” and since no tobacco production exists in
Norway, there was no quantitative restriction despite recognizing that imported
brands would have a much more difficult pathway in penetrating the
Norwegian market for tobacco products.261
The EFTA Court stated that Article 11 prohibits EEA member-states
from imposing regulations that treat imported goods differently than
domestic goods, regulations that affect both domestic and imported goods,
and regulations that hinder access to markets.262 The EFTA Court noted
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶¶ 36–37.
Id. ¶ 41.
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that the intent of Norway’s visual display ban was not to regulate trade
among EEA member-states, but that the ban is capable of making market
entry very difficult for new products.263 However, the EFTA Court noted
that if the ban were to be treated as a mere selling arrangement regulation
that covered both domestic and imported goods, then a quantitative
restriction is not present.264 Although the EFTA Court found that the visual
display ban was a selling arrangement regulation, the EFTA Court held that
the visual display ban would have a discriminatory effect on imported
tobacco products that were continuously imported into Norway in contrast
to those tobacco products that were previously manufactured in Norway.265
The EFTA Court acknowledged directly that tobacco brands formerly
produced in Norway would have an advantage, and suggested that tobacco
could at some point be manufactured once again in Norway.266 The EFTA
Court also stated that national courts, when addressing such an issue, must
consider the relevant characteristics of the market and any effects of a
visual ban on products that are new to the market.267
The second question for the EFTA Court was whether the Article 11
restriction could be allowed pursuant to Article 13. 268 Phillip Morris
contended that the visual display ban was not suitable for reducing tobacco
consumption and that Norway had an obligation to adopt a less-restrictive
approach to achieving that goal.269 Norway justified the visual display ban
on public health grounds, asserting that the ban was proportional in that it was
suitable to reduce tobacco consumption.270 The EFTA Court stated that
the burden of proof in such a matter should rest with the member-state
government. However, Norway contended that a member-state should not
be forced to prove that no other conceivable measure could be implemented
to meet the proportionality requirement.271
The EFTA Surveillance Authority believed that the visual display ban
could be justified on public health grounds pursuant to Article 13 and that
EEA member-states should be granted a wide level of discretion on such
matters.272 The European Commission agreed that the visual display ban was
acceptable under Article 13 as not only necessary, but also proportionate,

263.
264.
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further concluding that member-states should maintain wide discretion in
such matters.273
On the second question, the EFTA Court agreed that on the issue of
whether a regulation is proportionate, a member-state should be granted a
wide level of discretion to determine what degree of protection to give its
citizens in the field of public health.274 Moreover, the EFTA Court
acknowledged that this level of discretion could lead to varying levels of
protection across the member-states, but the fact that varying levels exist
does not make any one member-state’s level of protection disproportionate.275
However, contrary to the beliefs of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the
European Commission, and Norway, the EFTA Court stated that any
restriction on a fundamental freedom can only be justified if the restriction
is appropriate for obtaining the objective.276 According to the EFTA
Court, the area occupied by uncertainty in public health should allow a
member-state to act to reduce threats to public health. Further, each EEA
member-state should be given a presumption that it is doing what it can to
protect human health, even if the member-state maintains the burden of
proof.277 Although the EFTA Court believed that the visual display ban
was acceptable under Article 13, the EFTA Court stated that such an issue
should be resolved by a member-state’s court to determine whether a lessrestrictive measure is possible to achieve the public health goal.278
C. Health Concerns
Articles 11 and 13 prohibit EEA member-states from requiring importers
to gain permission from a member-state created alcohol monopoly before
importing alcohol.279 In Restamark, the EFTA Court entertained a challenge
by an importer wishing to bring several bottles of whiskey and wine into
Finland that already existed in commerce within the EEA.280 The importer
was required to seek, but was refused, authorization by Oy Alko Ab
273. Id. ¶¶ 75–76.
274. Id. ¶ 80.
275. Id.
276. Id. ¶ 81.
277. Id. ¶¶ 82–83, 85.
278. Id. ¶ 88.
279. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, Case E-1/94, EFTA Ct. Rep.
15, ¶ 61 (Dec. 16, 1994), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/1_94_
Judgment_EN_03.pdf.
280. Id. ¶ 2.
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(“OAA”), an entity created by the Finnish government maintaining a
monopoly on the manufacture, sale, and export of alcohol in Finland.281
The importer argued that such a permission-based restriction in the form of
a license on the importation of alcohol in Finland was a violation of
Article 11’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions on the free movement
of goods and not permitted as an exception pursuant to Article 13.282 In
contrast, the Finnish government argued that its licensing system was
necessary to promote its general health and social policy by attempting to
mitigate the harmful effects of alcohol.283
The EFTA Court held that the licensing system had the same effect as
a quantitative restriction and was thereby prohibited under Article 11.284
According to the EFTA Court, the licensing system could be an impediment
to trade among the EEA member-states and could create conditions of
delay and abuse by the member-state imposing such a system.285 Moreover,
the EFTA Court believed that the ECJ has consistently held t he same
position even when the licenses sought were granted automatically.286
The next question was whether the alcohol import licensing system was
permissible under Article 13 as a public health exception to Article 11.287
The EFTA Court did not doubt Finland’s argument that the alcohol licensing
system was designed to promote social and health concerns, but stated that
even in cases of public health concerns, any such restriction on the free
movement of goods must be proportionate to the goal of reducing alcohol
consumption.288 The EFTA Court did not find evidence that the goal of
reducing alcohol consumption could only be met by entrusting the total
control to alcohol to one state-granted monopoly.289 The EFTA Court
believed that the alcohol licensing system was too restrictive and thus a
violation of Article 11 and not permitted by Article 13.290
In Restamark, the EFTA Court also addressed the question of whether
entrusting total control over alcohol to a state-created monopoly was a
violation of Article 16 of the EEA Agreement, which prohibits the creation
of state-granted monopolies that engage in discrimination based on country
of origin in regard to the sale of goods.291 Most of the content in Article
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16 of the EEA Agreement mirrors Article 37 of the TFEU.292 Specifically,
Article 16 requires that any existing state-created monopolies be altered in a
way that their operations do not discriminate against goods coming from
other member-states.293 The EFTA Court held that Finland’s alcohol authority
as the guardian of the alcohol licensing system must be adjusted to allow
the importer in such a case to import alcohol products.294
An argument could be made that a member-state’s gravest public health
concern, whereby its stance that Article 13 should allow for restrictions, is
in the area of pharmaceuticals. However, in Grund, elli-og v. Icelandic
Medicines Agency, the EFTA Court held that a member-state cannot require
parallel importers of medicines to submit manufacturing control reports.295
In the case at bar, the plaintiff was an Icelandic nursing home operator
that purchased pharmaceuticals from a Norwegian wholesaler that purchased

1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that any State monopoly of a commercial
character be adjusted so that no discrimination regarding the conditions under
which goods are procured and marketed will exist between nationals of EC
Member States and EFTA States. 2. The provisions of this Article shall apply
to any body through which the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties,
in law or fact, either directly or indirectly supervise, determine or appreciably
influence imports or exports between Contracting Parties. These provisions shall
likewise apply to monopolies delegate by the State to others).
292. TFEU art. 37. (Article 37 (ex 31, 37) of the TFEU reads:
1. Member States shall adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character
so as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States. The
provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through which a Member State,
in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or appreciably
influences imports or exports between Member States. These provisions shall
likewise apply to monopolies delegated by the State to others. 2. Member States
shall refrain from introducing any new measure which is contrary to the principles
laid down in paragraph 1 or which restricts the scope of the Articles dealing with
the prohibition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member
States. 3. If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which are
designed to make it easier to dispose of agricultural products or obtain for them
the best return, steps should be taken in applying the rules contained in this
Article to ensure equivalent safeguards for the employment and standard of
living of the producers concerned).
293. Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, ¶ 65.
294. Id. ¶ 74.
295. Case E-7/11, Grund, elli- og hjúkrunarheimili v. Icelandic Medicines Agency
(Lyfjastofnun), EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, ¶ 68 (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.efta
court.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/7_11_Judgment_EN.pdf.
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the pharmaceuticals from another manufacturer.296 However, in order to
bring pharmaceuticals into Iceland, the Icelandic government required
proof that such pharmaceuticals fulfilled the requirements of an Icelandic
marketing authorization which according to the Icelandic government, the
invoice and SPC failed to meet, meaning that the nursing home should have
provided a control report as required by Icelandic law.297 According to the
Icelandic government, an SPC is not the equivalent of a control report.298
The key question posed to the EFTA Court was whether the Icelandic
government could deny a parallel importer’s ability to bring into Iceland
pharmaceuticals that have marketing authorizations from a fellow
member-state (here, Norway), on grounds that the Norwegian marketing
authorization does not meet the requirements of the Icelandic marketing
authorization for pharmaceuticals having the same name. 299 Second, the
EFTA Court had to determine how a parallel importer without access to
the original manufacturing control report could satisfy the concerns of the
Icelandic government if the first part of the question is answered
affirmatively. 300
The provision for a marketing authorization is embedded in EU
Directive 2001/83/EU, which mandates that no pharmaceutical product
can be placed in the marketplace of an EEA member-state unless it has
secured a marketing authorization that is designed to indicate that the
benefits of using the pharmaceutical outweigh the associated risks.301
The EFTA Court was primarily concerned with the fact that the
member-state requiring a unique marketing authorization for a pharmaceutical
subject to a parallel import, when the pharmaceuticals have the same
name, is likely to have all of the necessary information associated with
the pharmaceutical, thereby making concern for the health and safety of
its citizens unnecessary.302 Requiring that a parallel import submit a
manufacturing control report, which was not in the possession of the
parallel importer and was likely submitted previously by the domestic
seller of the same pharmaceutical, constituted an unnecessary measure
having the effective equivalent to a quantitative restriction under Article

296. Id. ¶ 14. In such a case, the nursing home is the parallel importer since the
pharmaceuticals in question were already available in Iceland with Icelandic authorization. The
wholesaler is merely an exporter.
297. Id. ¶ 15.
298. Id. ¶ 16.
299. Id. ¶ 22.
300. Id. ¶ 23.
301. Id. ¶ 51.
302. Id. ¶ 58.
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11 and not subject to a derogation under Article 13 since clearly lessrestrictive measures are possible.303
The EFTA Court did prescribe solutions to member-states such as
Iceland. According to the EFTA Court, member-states can engage in less
restrictive maneuvers such as requiring manufacturers to provide control
reports to the public, using existing information held by the member-state
and other member-states, instituting a rebuttable presumption of conformity
between the pharmaceutical already available in the member-state and
that which is subject to a parallel import, and allowing the parallel importer
to provide other information in an effort to prove conformity between the
domestically available pharmaceutical and its parallel import counterpart.304
The EFTA Court further discussed the merits of parallel importing in
that such importers work in the pharmaceutical sector in a way that allows
the price of pharmaceuticals to drop to the benefit of both patients and
national health care systems.305 Moreover, the presence of parallel importers
avoids “unnecessary partitioning” of the EEA marketplace by memberstate and avoids monopolies.306
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE ECJ’S JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 34
There are seven prevailing themes found in the ECJ’s jurisprudence.
First, according to the ECJ, any possible restriction posed by a memberstate must be proportionate to the member-state’s goal.307 In Re Disposable
Beer Cans, the ECJ stated that there must be a proportional balance struck
between a member-state’s concern for the environment and a restriction
on the free movement of goods pursuant to Article 34.308 However, the
ECJ found the requirement that any imported beer be placed in reusable cans
to be an unlawful quantitative restriction while stating that there would
exist other, less restrictive measures that could be employed to meet the
member-state’s concern for its environment.309 Likewise, in a case that
most would agree incorporates a more serious set of facts than beer cans,
the ECJ held in Humanplasma that member-states must allow those

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. ¶¶ 62–63, 66.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 64.
Id. ¶ 65.
Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607, ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21–22.
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importing human blood to show proof that the blood is untainted and safe
instead of a blanket rule that prohibits the import of human blood without
proof that the donor was unpaid for the donated blood.310 The ECJ found
Austria’s ban unpalatable given its proportionality test and further
provided methods member-states could employ to make sure donated blood
passing national boundaries is safe.311
A second and related theme in the Disposable Beer Cans and
Humanplasma cases is the strong preference by the ECJ to force memberstates to allow private parties to prove that they can meet the concerns of
the member-states. In Disposable Beer Cans, the ECJ suggested that
Denmark allow importers to prove that the beer cans they use could be
reusable instead of being forced to purchase a particular type of beer
can.312 In Humanplasma, the ECJ suggested that Austria could require
that blood be tested before importation.313 Thus, any member-state considering
a restriction on the free movement of goods in the form of a quantitative
restriction should anticipate that, if the restriction is challenged, the ECJ will
force the member-state to prove that a private party itself cannot show
means to meet the goal of the member-state that supports the restriction.
A third major theme depicted in this survey of cases is that memberstates must be uniform in their health concerns when defending a regulation
that amounts to a quantitative restriction. In Criminal Proceedings Against
Zoni, the ECJ found intolerable, in the face of Article 34, an Italian law
that prohibited the importation of pasta made of either common wheat or
a mix of durum wheat and common wheat, partially on grounds that Italy
had supplied no evidence that the imported pasta would contain any
harmful additives or colors.314 Similarly, the ECJ stated in Commission
v. Denmark that its ban on foodstuffs containing added vitamins and
minerals was a violation of Article 34 largely due to Denmark’s inability
to provide scientific proof that the ban was necessary to protect human
health.315 The ECJ provided a related result in Humanplasma stating that
since other member-states allow for blood donors to be compensated and
EU law requires testing of such blood donations, the Austrian government
could not enforce its ban on imported blood coming from member-states that
allowed for donor compensation.316 Likewise, Germany could not enforce
its ban on imported meat products that included non-meat elements against
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
20, 28.
315.
316.
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Article 34 since, although Germany attempted to justify the ban on grave
concerns for health, the ECJ found that Germany’s own research purported
that Germans were receiving sufficient amounts of protein in their diets.317
In a second case from Germany, Re Purity Requirements for Beer, the ECJ
found fault with Germany’s ban on imported beer products not meeting its
requirements, in part due to the fact that Germany prohibited certain
additives in beer yet allowed many of those additives to remain in its soft
drinks.318
The fourth major theme is the almost uniform faith the ECJ possesses
for warning labels as a means to allay fears among member-states that
consumers will not be protected from imported products in which they are
not familiar. In Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, despite fears on the
part of the Italian government that Italians would not be able to check the
accuracy of labeling, the ECJ endorsed the potential labeling requirement
as a means to meet Italy’s consumer protection concerns so that consumers
would know the contents of their purchased pasta.319 In a similar fashion,
the ECJ contended that labeling requirements in lieu of an absolute ban
would suffice to protect consumers from purchasing the wrong kind of
alcoholic beverage despite the similarity in bottle design in Re the Use of
Champagne-Type Bottles.320 The result was the same in Re Purity
Requirements for Beer, in which the ECJ stated that labeling requirements
could allow purchasers of beer to know the beverage’s contents. 321
Ironically, the ECJ rejected a Belgian requirement that Scotch whisky
imported into that member-state be accompanied by a certificate of
authenticity, which seemingly would serve the same function as a warning
label.322
The fifth major theme exhibited by these cases is the trust that the ECJ
has in consumers to make their own choices and choose their own risks.
The fourth major theme, the faith in warning labels, alone reflects an ECJ
belief that consumers will read those espoused warning labels. However,
the ECJ has gone further. In Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, the ECJ
317. Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R. 229, ¶¶ 2, 6, 8, 23.
318. Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987 E.C.R. 1227, ¶ 38.
319. Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. 4285, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 16, 17, 20.
320. Case C-179/85, Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Use of Champagne-Type Bottles), 1986
E.C.R. 3879, ¶¶ 13–15.
321. Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987 E.C.R. 1227, ¶ 33–
35.
322. Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 4. The ECJ’s
focus was more so on cost to the importer rather than consumer protection. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.
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specifically endorsed consumer preference by stating that it was desirable
to have many kinds of pasta available for purchase and consumers should
be able to use their purchasing power to choose a pasta.323 Likewise, in
Commission v. Germany, the ECJ contended that consumers should be
allowed to maintain choices as to the nutritional value of meat products
available for purchase.324
There are three cases surveyed in this work that exemplify the sixth
major theme, which is the ECJ’s insistence on equal treatment. In Conegate
v. HM Customs, the ECJ found a British ban on imported sex dolls
incompatible with Article 34 since the various political units in the United
Kingdom had different standards and the import ban itself was more
restrictive than any of those standards.325 The ECJ commented similarly
in Ahokainen and Leppik, stating that Finland’s requirement that alcohol
importers must maintain a license to do so violates Article 34 when the
goods being imported (alcohol) are legal, made, and marketed in Finland and
elsewhere.326
The last major theme revealed in the case law is the lack of support the
ECJ maintains for member-state regulations that may increase costs to the
importer. In Dassonville, the ECJ immediately picked up on Belgium’s
requirement that imported Scotch whisky be accompanied by a certificate
of authenticity, which would increase the cost to the importer and make
the importer’s product more expensive.327 The ECJ was equally concerned
with additional costs that could be extended to the importer in Re Disposable
Beer Cans in that the mandatory use of the government-required beer cans
could be an additional expense for the importer and possibly pricing the
importer out of the Danish market.328
However, there are two cases that do not fit the ECJ’s strict prohibition
on quantitative restrictions in the face of Article 34—Lucien Ortscheit and
Hahn. The facts of Lucien Ortscheit make it the most troublesome in light
of the dominant disposition of ECJ jurisprudence: the ECJ allowed
Germany to engage in an advertising ban of pharmaceuticals being imported
into Germany, but did not ban the pharmaceuticals themselves despite the
fact that the pharmaceuticals were available in other member-states.329
Although it is difficult to rationalize the ECJ’s decision in Lucien Ortscheit,
it likely rests with the fact that the ECJ itself stated that EU law was not

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
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harmonized on this topic.330 However, the facts of Hahn seem less than
compelling. Here, the ECJ allowed Austria to impose health-screening
standards above what EU law already required. 331 In other words, and
perhaps making the decision in Lucien Ortscheit more difficult to rationalize,
EU law had clearly been harmonized in the form of both a directive and a
decision on fish contamination.332
The lack of jurisprudential fit is perhaps strongest in Ministere Public
v. Mirepoix. In that case, the ECJ allowed France’s ban on imported
agricultural products that were sprayed with a banned pesticide.333 It could
certainly be argued that of all the cases surveyed in this work from the
ECJ, this case has the best set of pro-member-state regulation facts in that
the quantitative restriction was based on a dangerous and banned pesticide,
but the facts do not seem as compelling as those in Humanplasma, where the
Austrian ban was based on a concern that contaminated blood might flow
across member-state boundaries. Regardless, the facts of Humanplasma
seem more compelling than a concern for tainted fish crossing international
lines, as was the case in Hahn. Most likely, the ECJ’s decision in Hahn can
be justified on grounds that the ECJ found international scientific research
finding adverse health effects associated with the chemical by which the
Austrian government had attached a zero tolerance level.334
VII. SEPARATIONS AND SIMILARITIES IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
ECJ AND EFTA COURT AND ANALYSIS
The first separation in jurisprudence between the ECJ and the EFTA
Court can be found by examining Ullensaker Kommune v. Nille. In
Ullensaker, the EFTA Court upheld a Norwegian regulation against an
Article 11 attack requiring sellers of videos to maintain a license that
would be granted by Norwegian municipalities.335 The focus on the EFTA
Court’s decision was not on the ability of videos to make their way into
330. Id. ¶ 18.
331. Case C-121/00, Austria v. Hahn (Criminal Proceedings Against Walter Hahn)
2002 E.C.R. I-9193, ¶¶ 45–47.
332. Id.
333. Case C-54/85, Ministere Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, 1996 E.C.R. I-1067, ¶¶ 14,
16.
334. Hahn, 2002 E.C.R. I-9193, ¶¶ 34, 36, 39–41.
335. Ullensaker Kommune v. Nille AS, Case E-5/96, EFTA Ct. Rep. 30, ¶ 23 (May
14, 1997), available at http://eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/5_96_Advisory_Opinion
_EN.pdf.
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Norway, but instead the potential impact for unequal treatment once the
videos made their way inside Norway despite the fact that most videos
sold in Norway come into the country as imports.336 Although the EFTA
Court relied on the ECJ’s decision in Criminal Proceedings Against Keck
to reach a conclusion that the licensing regime should be upheld, the
EFTA Court’s ruling seems to part ways with the ECJ’s decision in
Ahokainen and Leppik. In the latter case, the ECJ found disfavor in light
of Article 34 with Finland’s requirement that alcohol importers have a
license to do so.337 The ECJ’s decision reflected a greater concern that the
importer would suffer increased costs associated with its product in
comparison to the EFTA Court’s lack of concern that the Norwegian video
sales license requirement would raise prices associated with imported
videos.338 What is also very noticeable when comparing the two licensing
cases is that the ECJ maintained its proportionality requirement while
the EFTA Court took a more deferential approach and stated that a national
court could better measure balance between Article 11 and Article 13.339
As stated above, the ECJ has been continuously concerned with the
extra costs that an importer may suffer because of a member -state’s
regulation on goods coming in from another member-state. Here lies the
second instance of separation between the ECJ and the EFTA Court. In
HOB-vin v. Iceland, the EFTA Court upheld Iceland’s requirement that
all imported alcohol come into the country on a government-authorized
pallet.340 Despite the plaintiff’s chief arguments that the authorized pallet
requirement would force additional costs to be assessed against its alcohol
product, the EFTA Court found that Article 11’s prohibition against
quantitative restrictions on imports did not apply to regulations applicable
to the procurement and marketing of products.341
The EFTA Court’s approach is quite different than the theory espoused
by the ECJ in the Dassonville, Ahokainen and Leppik, and Re Disposable
Beer Cans cases. In these three cases, the ECJ found that the requirement
of a certificate of authenticity, the mandate that importers of alcohol have
an import license, and perhaps more to the point, the requirement that
importers of beer used government-approved reusable cans to be an

336.
337.
338.
339.
33, 37.
340.
341.
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infringement of Article 34 based at least in part on the idea that importers
would suffer increased costs.342
The decision in Wilhelmsen v. Oslo kommune is a reflection of the third
ideological split between the EFTA Court and the ECJ. In Wilhelmsen,
the EFTA Court supported Norway’s requirement that a state-granted
monopoly maintain control over imported beer possessing an alcohol
content above a certain level.343 However, more importantly, the EFTA
Court upheld this level of member-state control based on public health
grounds (preventing alcohol abuse) thus allowing for a quantitative
restriction based on both Article 11 and Article 13 grounds.344 The approach
by the ECJ in Re Purity Requirements for Beer was quite different because
it expressly rejected Germany’s concern that its beer purity laws be upheld
in the face of Articles 34 and 36 on public health grounds and instead
decided to allow consumers to make their own choices pursuant to labeling
requirements.345 Similar comment could be made in regard to the ECJ’s
holding in Rewe-Zentral. Here, the ECJ found Germany’s minimum alcohol
content requirements for imported beer, that were based in part on Germany’s
concern that lower-level alcoholic products could create greater health
risks, to violate Article 34 as a quantitative restriction.346
The ECJ’s decision in Ahokainen and Leppik decision is much closer to
the EFTA Court’s decision in Wilhelmsen because the ECJ was willing to
defer to a national court at least to a degree in regard to a regulation that
limited the consumption of alcohol.347 Regardless, the ECJ still found the
Finnish restriction to violate Articles 34 and 36 on grounds that such a
restriction is likely to increase costs to the importer and there are other,
less restrictive means to achieve the public health goal of limiting access
to alcohol instead of a mandatory licensing system.348
Although there are some jurisprudential disconnections between the
ECJ and the EFTA Court, there are some strong jurisprudential likenesses.
342. Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 854; Ahokainen,
2006 E.C.R. I-9171, ¶ 35; Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
343. Wilhelmsen, EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, ¶111.
344. Id. ¶¶ 55, 87, 111.
345. Case C-178/84, Comm’n v. Den. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987
E.C.R. I-1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 780, 801–03, 807–08, 811 (1988).
346. Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979).
347. Wilhelmsen, EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, ¶ 57; Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 39–
40.
348. Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 29, 31, 35.
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The first can be found in the EFTA Court’s decision in EFTA Surveillance
Authority v. Norway, where it found Norway’s ban on the importation of
cornflakes (due to the fact they were fortified with several vitamins and
minerals) to be a violation of Article 11 above the member-state’s
concerns that the Norwegian population did not need such additives.349 In
three cases—Commission v. Denmark (enriched foodstuffs), Criminal
Proceedings Against Zoni (common wheat and durum wheat), and Commission
v. Germany (meat products with non-meat elements), the ECJ found
prohibitions on the importation of foodstuffs based on nutritional or
consumer protection concerns to be violations of Article 34.350 In Criminal
Proceedings Against Zoni and Commission v. Germany, the ECJ once again
found greater faith in consumers to make the correct choice based on the
content of a warning label.351 However, in Commission v. Denmark, the ECJ
was much more heavy-handed and demanded that a member-state prohibiting
imported foodstuffs based on content grounds must have scientific research
to support such a ban.352
A second connection in jurisprudence can be found in the Ahokainen
and Leppik and Restamark cases. The EFTA Court in Restamark found
that a Finnish regulation that required permission from a state monopoly
to import alcohol was an unjustified quantitative restriction under Article
11 and Article 13.353 The EFTA Court’s language in Restamark was much
stronger because it required a finding of proportionality to justify a restriction
on Article 13 grounds allowing for public health regulations.354 The EFTA
Court also did not believe a system in which control of alcohol was vested
in a state-granted monopoly was the best means to achieve Finland’s goal
of reducing alcohol consumption.355 Ahokainen and Leppik is another
case originating in Finland in which the ECJ likewise found the Finnish
requirement of a license from a state-granted monopoly inexcusable under
Articles 34 and 36.356 Similar to the EFTA Court in Restamark, the ECJ
required a finding of proportionality between the regulation and th e
member-state goal, which, according to the ECJ, did not exist.357
The decision by the EFTA Court in Fagtun ehf v. Byggingarnefnd
Borgarholtsskóla reflects jurisprudence closer to that of traditional ECJ
349. EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Ct. Rep. 73, ¶ 43.
350. Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶ 57; Zoni, 1988 E.C.R 4285, ¶¶ 12, 20,
28; Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R 229, ¶¶ 2, 7, 10, 23.
351. Zoni, 1988 E.C.R 4285, ¶¶ 14, 16; Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R 229, ¶ 13.
352. Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶¶ 46–48.
353. Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, ¶¶ 50, 61.
354. Id. ¶¶ 57–59.
355. Id. ¶ 60.
356. Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 22, 30.
357. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.
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decisions and represents a third example of agreement between the two
European courts. In Fagtun ehf, the EFTA Court stated that Iceland’s
requirement that all building materials to be used on school buildings be
manufactured in Iceland violated Article 11.358 Of important note in Fagtun
ehf was the EFTA Court’s comment that no proof existed that the imported
school building materials could not have met the standards set by the
Icelandic government and that the regulation was a blatant form of
discrimination favoring national production of such materials as no imported
materials could possibly be manufactured under the supervision of
the Icelandic government.359 Furthermore, the EFTA Court stated that
Iceland should maintain the burden of proof to show that other imported
materials could not meet the standards set by Iceland.360
Two cases from the ECJ identified in this work are similar to the Fagtun
ehf decision by the EFTA Court. The ECJ’s decision in Re Disposable
Beer Cans similarly required the Danish government to relinquish its
requirement that beer importers use preapproved beer cans in contrast to
a more preferable system whereby the beer importer could show that its
beer cans could pass muster against Danish public health standards.361 As
well, the ECJ in Humanplasma made several suggestions serving as
alternatives to the Austrian government as to how it could protect its citizens
against the risks associated with tainted, imported blood while recognizing a
heightened level of authority for member-states to set restrictions based
on public health grounds.362
Perhaps the most unusual jurisprudential connection between the EFTA
Court and the ECJ can be found while examining the former’s decision in
Phillip Morris and the latter’s decision in Lucien Ortscheit. The link
between these cases is unusual due to the fact that both courts found tolerable
a restriction affecting imports. In Phillip Morris, the EFTA Court upheld
in the face of an Article 11 challenge an all-encompassing ban on tobacco
advertising which included both domestic and imported brands despite the
fact that the domestic tobacco brands would have an advantage over the
imported rivals since Norwegian consumers would naturally be more

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Fagtun ehf., EFTA Ct. Rep. 51, ¶¶ 30–32
Id. ¶¶ 25, 30, 32.
Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.
Comm’n v. Den.,(Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
Humanplasma GmbH, 2010 E.C.R I-2389, ¶¶ 39–40, 43–45.
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familiar with the brands formerly produced in Norway.363 The EFTA Court
found the Norwegian advertising ban to be more of a regulation on selling
arrangements.364 In Lucien Ortscheit, the ECJ upheld (in the face of Articles
34 and 36) an advertising ban on pharmaceuticals imported into Germany
while still allowing for the importation of these pharmaceuticals.365 In
contrast to the EFTA Court, the ECJ found the German ban tolerable under
Article 36 as a limitation on imports to protect human health.366
VIII. CONCLUSION AND THE THREAT TO EEA HARMONY
Some scholars have commented that the international legal system is
becoming fractured in its jurisprudence.367 Admittedly, this work only
explores a few cases that highlight some of the differences in jurisprudence
between the ECJ and the EFTA Court on the subject of the free movement
of goods in an attempt to gauge the level of, and momentum for, the
harmonization of law only in Europe and only on the topic of free movement
of goods. However, it should be noted that these are not the only prominent
European courts charged either expressly or impliedly with the harmonization
of law in Europe. Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights should be part of
any calculus to gauge the level of harmonization of law in Europe, especially
on the topics of economic rights and taxation on which both the TFEU
and EEA comment.368 Regardless of the reason for the jurisprudential
difference, the difference presents several risks to the legal efforts toward
harmony in the EEA common market.
The first risk is that the EEA will evolve into a “two-speed” trade
association whereby the EU countries will be harnessed by tighter restrictions
on any attempt to enact rules that will limit the cross-border trade of goods
in comparison to the countries of Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland.
Over time, the uncertainty over the interpretation of common market law
could cause trade distortions as some traders will be more comfortable
trading within the EU and thus, in order to reduce the risk of being blocked
363. Philip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State, Case E-16/10, EFTA Ct.
Rep. 330, ¶¶ 16, 35–37, 51, 86, 88 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/
uploads/tx_nvcases/16_10_Judgment_EN.pdf.
364. Id. ¶¶ 43–45.
365. Lucien Ortscheit GmbH, 1994 E.C.R I-5243, ¶¶ 12, 20–21.
366. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.
367. Ioana Cismas, The Integration of Human Rights in Bilateral and Plurilateral
Free Trade Agreements: Arguments for a Coherent Relationship with Reference to the
Swiss Context, 21 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 5 (2013).
368. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance as Guardian of the
Constitutional Unity of International Economic Law, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
367, 417–18 (2008).
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by a domestic regulation, those same traders will concentrate on the markets
of the 28 EU member-states to the detriment of the remaining EEA
member-states. As stated above, it was a chief concern among firms
located in countries outside the EU/EEC during the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s that forged a stronger relationship between the EU and the EFTA
countries resulting in the EEA. A return to a two-speed Europe would expose
firms outside the EU, but within the EEA, to risks that they become
relatively less competitive in comparison to the firms within the EU.
This two-speed Europe would also expose the citizens of the three
EFTA countries to a reduction in the level of competition among firms
producing goods. If the EFTA Court continues to find ways to allow
member-states in the EEA, but not in the EU, to enact restrictions even in
the face of an Article 11 attack, those citizens will face higher prices and
potentially poorer quality. Thankfully, the EFTA Court found some limits
on the ability of a member-state to enact restrictions in EFTA Surveillance
Authority and Fagtun. Regardless, the Ullensaker, HOB-vin, and Wilhelmsen
cases are still good law.
A second risk is that with continuing differences in common market law
interpretation, the EEA dissolves. It is foreseeable that if the disparity in
jurisprudence continues, at some point in time the EU government will
take action to push the EFTA Court, and the EFTA member-states, to
adopt a stricter interpretation of common market law. In turn, if the EFTA
countries do not find this palatable, these three member-states may exit
the alliance. The potential for a split is not motivated by jurisprudential
differences alone. As mentioned above, Iceland is no longer seeking entry
into the EU. At the time of this writing, the United Kingdom, a current EU
member and former EFTA member, is contemplating a referendum on
maintaining member-state status.369
A third risk is the worst imaginable. Given the current momentum
toward protectionist measures being adopted by all countries (albeit
largely due to political winds that have been produced by poor economic
conditions), many of the EU countries could become more comfortable
with the EFTA Court’s jurisprudence and push the ECJ, and the EU
government in general, to adopt the EFTA Court’s jurisprudence. Although

369. Nicolas Winning, U.K.’s Tony Blair Attacks David Cameron EU Referendum
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-s-tony-blairslams-david-camerons-eu-referendum-plan-1428411875?KEYWORDS=United+Kingdom+
referendum.
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it would most certainly be viewed as shortsighted and politically motivated,
but if domestic politicians see a gain by pushing for greater restrictions on
imports, the EU’s common market itself could be in jeopardy.
One explanation for the jurisprudential differences between the EFTA
Court and the ECJ, aside from the cultural differences discussed throughout
this work, could rest on reality that the EFTA Court’s jurisdiction is more
limited in comparison to the ECJ’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that both
courts are charged with interpreting the EEA uniformly.370 Currently, the
EFTA trade group is in negotiations with several other countries in various
areas of the world including other non-EU, non-EEA countries, Central
Asian countries, and even East Asian countries. 371 However, there is
comment that trade negotiations on the part of EFTA have focused more
on general guidelines instead of specific rules which leads one to believe
that the trade group is still not ready for more integrative economic
relations.372 It will be very interesting to see if the EFTA changes its trade
focus towards greater integration over time reflective of a common market
or continues to maintain a less integrative path akin to traditional free
trade agreements.
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